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EMINENT DOMAIN AFTER KELO V. NEW LONDON: IS 
CHANGE IMMINENT? 
By 
Dennis D. DiMarzio*, Glenna Summer**, and Lonnie 
Jackson*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has historically 
played the critical role of hearing and deciding cases that 
ultimately define our society as one oflaw. Many of the 
Court's decisions have been handed down with little fanfare, 
and any national publicity and debate faded soon thereafter. 
Sometimes, however, the Court renders a landmark decision 
which involves such a fundamental right and has such 
immediate and long term implications that a firestorm of 
national publicity and debate continue long after the decision 
date. One June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court decided such a 
case, Kelo v. New London, 1 an eminent domain decision, and 
the firestorm of publicity and debate continues. In Keto, 2 the 
Court dramatically expanded the eminent domain power of 
government to take private property for "public purposes" 
rather than "public use." The Court reasoned that a 
Connecticut city could constitutionally take private property in 
the name of economic development by a private developer. 
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The purpose of this paper shall be to analyze the controversial 
case of Kelo v. New London3 and to evaluate its clear 
implications. A brief historical overview of the law of eminent 
domain will be presented in order to gain a proper perspective 
of the Keto decision. The Keto decision will then be discussed. 
Finally, the implications ofthis decision will be evaluated. 
II. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
The "Takings Clause" located in the Constitution's 
Fifth Amendment reads: " .. . Nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. "4 That Clause 
has been applied to the States through the Court's 
incorporation of the Takings Clause into the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause.5 This Constitutional basis 
for the Government's eminent domain power is fundamentally 
important. But even before these Constitutional provisions 
were penned, the Founders embraced property ownership as a 
fundamental right of liberty. Philosopher John Locke believed 
that the right to property was a natural right to man. That 
" .. . governments were formed to protect the natural rights of 
man ... "6 was "most influential"7 for the Founders. James 
Madison Thomas Jefferson and John Adams embraced the 
' 8 Lockean view of property and by the late eighteenth century 
the "Lockean" view was widely accepted in America.9 
A. Early Decisions Protecting Private Property 
Two Supreme Court decisions highlight the Court's 
primary concern with protecting property interests. 
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,1 declared in 1795 a 
Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional that would have resolved 
a land dispute by taking property away from certain 
Pennsylvania citizens and transferring it to a group of 
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subsequent settlers.11 The Court found it repugnant to seize the 
property of one citizen to give it to another citizen. 12 In the 
1798 Calder v. Bull decision, 13 the Court again refused to 
support a decision that " . .. takes property from A and gives it to 
B."I4 
B. Clear Public Use Approach 
Government, however, could take property and transfer 
title to itself for some use such as a military facility, a 
public road or a park. 1 Furthermore, that public use 
interpretation was stretched to include condemnations and 
transfers of title from one private party to another when the 
subsequent use would be available to the public at large. 
Common examples include common carriers like railroads, a 
public utility, or a stadium. 16 
C. Public Benefit or Public Purpose Approach 
Two landmark Supreme Court decisions dramatically 
expanded the meaning of "public use" to include "public 
benefit" or "public furpose" in eminent domain takings. In 
Berman v. Parker, 1 congress identified a blighted 
neighborhood in Washington D.C. and determined that it had 
become "injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and 
welfare" and that it was necessary to "eliminate all such 
injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and 
appropriate for the purpose," including eminent domain. 18 The 
case involved the wholesale taking of hundreds of urban 
dwellings, razing them, and then turning their sites over to 
private developers who would then build new improvements 
for their private, profit-making purposes. Mr. Berman objected 
to the taking of hi non-blighted department store. However, 
the Court allowed the taking of the neighborhood as a whole. 
In Hawaii housing Authority v. Midkiff, 19 the Court approved 
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an eminent domain taking of real property from lessors and 
transferring it to lessees on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, where 
it was said there was oligopolistic state of freehold title that 
was "skewing the State 's residential fee simple market, 
inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and 
welfare."20 The Court had expanded its view of"public use." 
In 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court allowed the City 
of Detroit to accomplish a pervasive eminent domain taking in 
the name of"economic development." In Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,21 the City of Detroit 
sought to prevent a pending unemployment crisis and to spur 
"economic development." The City was allowed to condemn 
and take the entire residential community of Poletown and then 
sell the property at a dramatically reduced price to General 
Motors. The purpose of the sale was to guarantee that General 
Motors would not close operations in the area. the taking 
included churches, school, hospitals, and displaced over thirty-
four hundred residents. 22 
In 2004, however, the Michigan Supreme court 
effectively overturned its Poletown decision in the case of 
County of Wayne v. Hathcock. 23 The County of Wayne started 
a project for the development of business and technology near 
its new Metropolitan Airport terminal and jet runway. The 
county commenced a series of condemnation proceedings to 
acquire the property for developers. The County claimed not 
blight removal but rather improvement of the local economy 
with projected new jobs and substantial additional tax revenue. 
The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the 
condemnation claims and thus narrowed its interpretation of 
"public use." The Court established three tests, and of which 
would be sufficient to justify a condemnation under Michigan 
law. First, the Court announced a "Public Necessity Test." 
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Eminent domain must be limited to enterprises that generate 
public benefit, and whose very existence depends on land that 
can only be provided by the central government. 24 Second, the 
Court stated its "Public Accountability Test." When the 
private entity remains accountable to the public in its use of the 
property, a public use exists.25 Finally, the Court identified its 
"Public Concern Test." A public use exists when the selection 
of the condemned land for a private interest is based on 
immediate public concerns and facts of independent public 
significance?6 The Decision was in sharp contrast to the 
expanded Po let own construction of "public use" for an eminent 
domain taking. Instead, The Hathcock Court required that in 
order to justify an eminent domain taking of property near the 
new Metropolitan Airport runway, it would apply the three 
tests and require that at least one of them be satisfied. 
III. KELO V NEW LONDON 
Should there be a broad definition of"public use" as 
opposed to applying tests and imposing greater scrutiny for an 
eminent domain taking of private property? The expanding 
and diverse case law involving eminent domain proceedings 
clearly showed that lower courts were struggling with this 
question. In Keto v. New London,27 the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and seized the opportunity to answer this question in 
an eminent domain case from Connecticut. The Court would 
offer its modern day definition for an appropriate taking under 
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. The City ofNew London, 
Connecticut approved an integrated development plan designed 
to revitalize its ailing economy. Through its development 
agent, the City purchased most of the property targeted for the 
project from willing sellers, but initiated condemnation 
proceedings against certain unwilling sellers. Invoking a state 
statute that specifically authorized eminent domain to promote 
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economic development, and arguing that Supreme Court 
precedent and its expanded definition of "public use" should 
justify its condemnation claims, the City ofNew London 
prevailed before the Supreme Court of Connecticut.28 
The City ofNew London intended the development 
plan to capitalize on the Pfizer Company building a major 
facility . It was expected to create jobs, increase tax and other 
revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, 
including its downtown and waterfront areas. Suzette Kelo had 
lived in the area since 1997 and had made extensive 
improvements to her water view home. In all, there were nine 
parties inc1uding Ms. Kelo who contested the condemnation 
c1aims. While the Connecticut Supreme Court ultimately 
approved the taking, the dissenting justices would have 
imposed a "heightened" standard of judicial review for takings 
justified by economic development. They would have found 
the takings unconstitutional because the City failed to establish 
by "c1ear and convincing evidence" that the economic benefits 
of the plan would have been realized."29 
In affirming the Kelo30case, the Supreme Court not only 
embraced the broad definition of "public use" to inc1ude public 
purpose, but it also clearly rejected any "heightened" review 
for takings justified by economic development. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Stevens noted that a rational basis review was 
appropriate because, "there is ... no principled way of 
distinguishing economic development from other public 
purposes we have recognized."31 Furthermore, he noted that 
the Court has a "longstanding policy of deference to legislative 
judgments in the field."32 He also emphasized" ... that nothing 
in our opinion precludes any state from placing further 
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. ,,33 
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Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of a divided court. 
In a five to four decision, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer and 
Kennedy joined Justice Stevens. Justice Kennedy filed a 
concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy suggested that in certain 
cases a heightened standard of review should be used. In 
" ... cases in which the transfers are so suspicious, or the 
procedures employed so prone to abuse, or the benefits are so 
trivial or implausible, that courts should presume an 
impermissible private purpose."34 He emphasized that Keto 
was not such a case. The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, Justice 
O'Connor, and Justice Thomas dissented. Justice O'Connor 
and Justice Thomas wrote separate dissenting opinions. Those 
dissenting opinions serve as a foundation of the next section of 
this paper, where the implications of the Kelo decision will be 
evaluated. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF KELO 
A. The Kelo Dissenting Opinions 
There is no better place to begin the evaluation of the 
implications of the Kelo decision than to examine the separate 
dissenting opinions written in the case by Justice O'Connor 
and Justice Thomas. Justice O'Connor expressed her concerns 
about the decision in two remarkable observations: 
The spector of condemnation hangs over all property. 
Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any 
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping 
mall, or any farm with a factory . . .. The beneficiaries 
are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate 
influence and power in the political process including 
large corporations and development firms. 35 
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Justice O'Connor clearly felt the Court too broadly defined 
"public use" under the Takings Clause and that it abdicated its 
responsibility to properly enforce the Constitution when it 
suggested that the States could choose appropriate limits on 
economic development takings. 
Justice Thomas warned that the Kelo decision was "far 
reaching, and dangerous. "36 He traced the law of government 
takings and reasoned that the Court had gone too far in 
defining "public use". 37 Furthermore, he referred to earlier 
urban renewal projects that some described as 'Negro 
removal. ' He observed that a disproportionate percentage of 
lower income, elderly, and non-white people would likely be 
impacted by the Court's decision.38 
Justice Thomas argued that "There is no 
justification . .. for affording almost insurmountable deference to 
legislative conclusions that a use serves a public purpose. "39 
He stated that the Court has lon§ had an " ... overriding respect 
for the sanctity of the home ... " 0 and that the Court " ... would 
not defer to a legislature's determination of the various 
circumstances that establish . . . when a search of a home would 
be reasonable."41 Yet, the Court cannot" ... second-guess ... 
whether the government may take the infinitely more intrusive 
step of tearing down ... homes."42 He poignantly observes, 
"Though citizens are safe from the government in their homes, 
the homes themselves are not."43 
No less than two Supreme Court Justices then warned 
of the pending problems resulting from the Kelo decision. 
They were joined in their dissents by two additional justices, 
Chief Justice Rhenquist and Justice Scalia. Since the Kelo 
decision, Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have replaced Chief 
Justice Rhenquist and Justice O'Connor, but ifleft the Kelo 
majority intact. That being true, it is therefore highly unlikely 
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that the newly composed Court would agree to hear a new case 
testing the Takings Clause or that they would do anything other 
than affirm the Kelo decision. 
While the ultimate Kelo decision and the strong 
dissenting opinions that were a part of it will long be 
remembered, perhaps the most significant aspect of the case 
was justice Stevens' statements in the opinion that the Court 
would defer to legislative judgments in the field and " .. . that 
nothing in our opinion precludes any state from placing further 
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power."44 These are 
telling statements that leave the door wide open for state 
legislatures and state supreme courts to tailor their own state 
takings power. When the Supreme Court rendered a decision 
in the Kelo case, they essentially decided not to ultimately 
resolve the takings question, but rather to leave it to the states. 
B. New Takings, Public Opinion, and State Governments 
It is much too soon to properly gauge the ultimate 
impact of the Kelo decision. However, certain early 
observations suggest where things might be headed. Prior to 
the Kelo decision, there was an increase in the number of 
eminent domain claims. "According to the Institute for Justice, 
more than 10,000 properties were threatened or taken by 
eminent domain between 1998 and 2002."45 Based on the 
Court's broader interpretation for "public use" and the number 
of communities who are interested in economic development to 
attract new business and expand tax revenue, the number of 
takings claims is likely to rise dramatically. 
Another clear early observation is that the public 
generally reacted negatively to the Kelo decision and to the use 
of eminent domain takings to further economic development. 
According to Dana Berliner of the Institute for Justice, "Polls 
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show public opposition has ranged from 70 percent to more 
than 90 percent of respondents.'"'6 This would point toward 
people lobbying their state legislators for laws to restrict such 
takings and to fight legal claims in the area if their property is 
targeted. 
Based on this overwhelming public opposition and the 
Keto Court's ruling that states could choose appropriate limits 
on takings connected with economic development, it seems 
likely that state governments will address this issue with new 
legislation. In fact, according to Larry Morandi, who tracks 
eminent domain issues for the National Conference for State 
Legislators, that is precisely what is happening. "Lawmakers 
in 44 states have drawn up more than 320 eminent domain 
bills.'"'7 Alabama, Michigan and Ohio took steps to limit or 
place a moratorium on the use of eminent domain for economic 
development purposes. South Dakota sought to block takings 
for any private person or nongovernment entity. Pennsylvania 
proposed a ban on private development takings bu the measure 
would exempt Philadelphia and for seven years. 
The early state bills are very restrictive.4 Even the Federal 
Government has been considering bills that would restrict the 
use of federal funds to s'!fsport condemnation that "primarily 
benefits private entities.' 9 
C. First State Post Keto Decision: Norwood v. Horney 
On July 26, 2006, the Ohio State Supreme Court became 
the first state high court to decide a case involving eminent 
domain issues since the Keto decision. In the case of Norwood 
v. Horney,50 a development project in Norwood Ohio gave rise 
to the property owners ' challenge. Norwood was a community 
near Cincinnati that had undergone changes that " ... eroded its 
industrial base, diminished its financial strength, shifted its 
nature from residential to commercial and increased noise, 
67 I Vol. 17 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
pollution, and traffic."51 The City entered into an agreement 
with a private firm to plan economic development. The plan 
called for construction of apartments and condominiums, 
commercial office space and parking with substantial revenue 
earmarked for the city. The firm was able to purchase most of 
the affected property, but the City commenced eminent domain 
proceedings against owners who refused to sell. The City 
relied on a consultant's conclusion that the neighborhood was a 
"deteriorating area" in danger of becoming a blighted area and 
proceeded under the Norwood Code to take the property. A 
state trial court upheld the taking and an appeals court denied a 
stay of that judgment. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed those 
lower court decisions. 
The Ohio Supreme Court steered away from the Keto 
decision and instead cited the Keto dissent and the Hathcoc/22 
Michigan Supreme Court decision to use a heightened scrutiny 
test in reviewing the eminent domain powers. The Court ruled 
that the fact the appropriation would provide an economic 
benefit to the government and community, standing alone, did 
not satisfy the public use requirement of the Ohio Constitution. 
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the use of "deteriorating 
area" as a standard for determining whether private property is 
subject to appropriation was unconstitutionally void for 
vagueness. Finally, the Court ruled that that part of the City of 
Norwood Code which permitted the taking and using of 
appropriated property after the compensation had been 
deposited but prior to appellate review was also 
unconstitutional in violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine. 53 This case clearly shows that the Kelo decision 
potentially might not signal a change in how state courts handle 
eminent domain cases. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The sharply divided Supreme Court Keto decision, the 
public's generally negative reaction to that decision, and 
numerous states enacting new "takings" legislation are all 
factors that suggest that more litigation will continue. The 
Court's dramatic expansion of the interpretation of"public 
use" to include "public purpose" under the Fifth Amendment's 
Takings Clause in the name of economic development, and the 
common "blight" problems in America's larger cities invite 
such litigation. Furthermore, politicians and those in state and 
local governments will have difficult decisions in navigating a 
path to protect private property interests on the one hand and to 
promote economically healthy cities on the other hand. 
Wealthy developers and major corporations seeking 
government inducements to stay in one city or to relocate to 
another city will only add to the difficulty of those decisions. 
The Court's decision in Keto not to use a heightened 
scrutiny test in "Takings" cases involving economic 
development, its announced deference to state and local 
governments' decision in those cases, and its general 
abdication to state governments to pass more restrictive laws in 
this area has ultimately served to make a gray and cloudy area 
of law even more gray and cloudy. Indeed, the new state 
legislation, and likely increased litigation in numerous states 
suggests we have storm clouds forming and new decisions 
from the various states will be raining down on us soon. 
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